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Just a ‘Bubble’?
Perspectives on the Enforcement of International
Criminal Law by National Courts

Abstract
The international criminal justice project is not in decline. Its focus, however, has
shifted to where it, arguably, belongs: to national courts. National courts are integral to both the origins and the future of international criminal justice. The difficulties involved in national prosecutions led to the establishment of international
courts and the rise of universal jurisdiction; the difficulties in using these latter
forums, in turn, is leading back to national courts. This article examines the forward
movement and the backlash of the enforcement of international criminal law by
national courts, drawing in particular on the Latin American and the Spanish
examples. It concludes by arguing that the hangover after the euphoria should be
used to correct the sky-high expectations and to (re)determine the relationship
between international and national and among different national jurisdictions.

1. Introduction
As I sit down to write about the decline of international criminal justice, a
national court in Guatemala has set a date for the trial of former dictator
Efrain R|¤ os Montt and his former head of military intelligence, accused in the
massacre of over 1700 Ixil Mayans from 1982 to 1983. For the first time, a
former head of state in the Americas has been held over for trial on charges of
genocide and crimes against humanity. It has taken 12 years to get here.
Perhaps this is a metaphor. The problem is not so much that the international criminal justice project is in decline, as it is that the focus has shifted
back to where, arguably, it belongs: to national trials in the courts of the
state where the crimes occurred. Often, despite the universal lip service paid
to so-called ‘positive’ complementarity, in terms of resources and attention
national prosecutions for international crimes have been seen as somehow
peripheral to the international justice project, but they are integral to both its
origins and its future. It was, in part, recognition of the difficulties involved in
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national criminal prosecutions that led the turn to using foreign and international courts; it is the difficulties in using these latter fora, and the overselling
of their potential, that is leading the cases, in turn, back to national courts.
That is, I think, as it should be.
But that does not mean it’s easy.

2. National Courts and International Crimes

1 Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, ‘Estad|¤ sticas de los juicios por cr|¤ menes de lesa humanidad en Argentina’, October 2012, available online at www.cels.org.ar/blogs; ICSO, ‘Latest
Human Rights Case Statistics for Chile’, available online at www.icso.cl/observatorio-derechoshumanos/cifras-causas-case-statistics (all websites visited 29 April 2013).

Downloaded from http://jicj.oxfordjournals.org/ at UC Hastings College of the Law on June 16, 2016

National courts continue to grapple with whether to prosecute serious crimes
from the past in light of difficulties with amnesties, statutes of limitations
and concerns about retroactivity and potential violations of the principle of
legality. On balance, the overall trend is towards prosecutions, but it is by no
means unidirectional. National prosecutions have moved forward in Latin
America, albeit unevenly and with difficulty, even where amnesty laws once
prevailed. The statistics are impressive: in Argentina, as of 2012, 1943 people
have been held for trial in cases arising from the ‘dirty war’ of the 1970s.
Many of the accused are now being tried in what are termed as ‘mega-trials’
involving dozens of defendants and hundreds of victims and witnesses. In
Chile, 800 state agents have been held for trial in 1342 cases for killing, forced
disappearance or (in a few cases only) torture during the Pinochet dictatorship. To date, 250 have been convicted.1 In Peru, former President Fujimori
was convicted of both human rights and corruption related crimes, and several
top army officers are also in jail, although a larger number have been acquitted
of human rights related crimes. Investigations and prosecutions for international crimes are underway as well in Uruguay, Colombia and Ecuador. In
Brazil, prosecutors are investigating forced disappearances as ‘kidnappings’
not subject to an amnesty law.
In a few countries, including Peru, Argentina and Uruguay, amnesties have
been formally annulled, while in others like Chile the laws, while still in
place, have been interpreted to exclude international crimes. In most countries
in the region, international crimes have only recently (if at all) been incorporated into the penal code, and so most prosecutions are for common crimes
like murder and kidnapping. However, courts have found that these crimes in
the context of 1970s and 1980s repression also constitute, at least since
Nuremberg, crimes against humanity, which are prohibited as a matter
of customary law. As such, they are not subject to statutes of limitation or
other impediments to prosecution, and may thus be tried without violating
principles of legality.
The Inter-American Commission and Court have played a key role in insisting that the rights of the victims require that such crimes be investigated
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2 Thomas Kwoyelo alias Latoni v. Uganda [2011], UGCC 10, 21 September 2011, available online at
www.ulii.org/ug/judgment/2011/10 (visited 29 April 2013).
3 For a more detailed explanation of the case, see my ASIL Insight entry, published 25 July 2012,
available online at www.asil.org/pdfs/insights/insight120725.pdf, from which some of this
section is excerpted.
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and, where warranted, prosecuted, starting with the 2001 Barrios Altos case,
followed by similar rulings in cases involving Chile, Brazil, Uruguay and, most
recently, El Salvador. Even where there have been few inroads into the amnesty
law, for example in Brazil and El Salvador, the Inter-American Court’s rulings
have created pressure on judges and the executive branch. Transnational prosecutions, discussed below, have added to that pressure, as has the existence of
persistent and creative groups of victims, family members and human rights
advocates.
Of course, forward movement has created backlash, as it does in all these
cases. In Chile, those most closely connected to forced disappearances will
spend their lives in prison, but many others have been convicted and then
released with little or no jail time as a result of reductions in sentence based
on the passage of time. In Peru, mid-ranking officers have been acquitted
when judges refuse to apply the theories of indirect liability pioneered in the
Fujimori trial, and insist on evidence of direct participation in crimes. In
Guatemala, defendants have managed endless delays, and have invited the
country’s Constitutional Court to annul the provisions of the 1996 amnesty
law that exempt genocide, disappearances and other international crimes
from its application. And in Brazil, the Supreme Court held in 2010 that torture
and killings by the military are still covered by an amnesty law. Still, the overall regional balance tilts against impunity for these crimes.
Elsewhere, some of the difficulties involved in meshing national and international prosecutions can be seen in the decision by Uganda’s Constitutional
Court to uphold the application of the 2000 amnesty law despite changes
in the law and arguments that blanket amnesties for the Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA) would violate Uganda’s treaty obligations. The first case to come
before the newly-constituted International Crimes Division, that of LRA
commander Thomas Kwoyelo, resulted in a finding that amnesty must apply
under principles of equal protection, since other LRA members had
been granted amnesty and the government never provided for the specific
exemptions required under the law.2 More than an endorsement of amnesties,
perhaps, the case may be read to stand for the problems involved in changing
horses mid-stream.
In another example of a counter-current, Spain’s highest court also rejected
arguments that international crimes have to be prosecuted despite legal impediments. In a case involving the removal of Investigating Magistrate
Baltasar Garzo¤n from his position, the Supreme Court held that Garzo¤n’s investigations into the fate of those whose bodies were never found in the wake
of the Spanish Civil War (1936^1939) were unwarranted.3 Garzo¤n, following
the reasoning of the Argentine and other Latin American courts as well as
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3. Universal Jurisdiction
One area where pruning back has definitely occurred is in the acceptance
and use of universal jurisdiction to prosecute international crimes in
third party courts. But it is heavy pruning, not complete amputation. The
pruning has taken the form of requiring much closer links between the
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previous decisions of Spanish courts in cases involving Argentina and Chile,
initially ruled that he had jurisdiction because these were international
crimes, and so not subject to either amnesty or a statute of limitations.
Eventually, after finding that no potential defendants were still alive, he sent
the case to local courts to determine where the bodies were buried.
Garzo¤n’s act provoked a complaint to the courts that he had committed the
crime of prevaricacio¤n, which requires that the judge knowingly and deliberately act against settled law. On 27 February 2012, the Supreme Court found
him innocent of that charge. But the Court went on to discuss why Garzo¤n’s
initial rulings, even though not criminal, had been incorrect. It found that,
first, Garzo¤n could not use Spanish criminal proceedings when the purpose
of the investigation was to look into historical truth rather than focusing
narrowly on a criminal defendant. Second, it declared that the case could not
be brought under the principle of legality (the prohibition on ex post facto
law). Garzo¤n had found that the civil war era crimes constituted a continuing
crime of illegal detention, which given the circumstances was at the same
time a domestic crime, and a crime against humanity under customary international law. As noted above, this dual nature of acts that are simultaneously
national and international crimes has been widely used in Latin American
courts to allow prosecution of crimes that were not defined as international
crimes in the penal codes of the time. The Court rejected the continuing
crimes argument, and found that because no international law exception
could apply, the crimes were subject to the statute of limitations of national
penal law, which had long since expired. With respect to Spain’s 1977
Amnesty Law, the Court found that, even if the amnesty law would now be
considered a violation of international law, that determination is not
retroactive.
Like the Ugandan Constitutional Court, and like the Brazilian Supreme
Court in 2010, the Spanish Court in essence found that the decisions
made long ago, before the consolidation of anti-impunity norms, had to override those current norms; all three courts grounded their decisions in the principles of legality and non-retroactivity of the penal law. Whatever one may
think of the reasoning, eventually the codification of international crimes
in national law, and of their inamnestiable and imprescriptable characteristics,
should make arguments about retroactivity less and less salient. And given
the countervailing jurisprudence from other courts, especially in Latin
America, the overall balance is probably slightly favourable to advocates of
prosecutions.
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4 The modification to Art. 23.4 can be found in Organic Law 1/09, 3 November 2009.
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alleged crimes and the forum state, and of making the use of these courts
secondary to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Thus, in Spain, as in
Belgium before it, pressure from the United States, Israel and China about
ongoing, and embarrassing, investigations into top officials led to a 2009
modification of Article 23.4 of the Organic Law, which in the wake of the
Pinochet case had grounded a large number of requests to the Spanish
courts to intervene. The modification limits Spanish jurisdiction to those
cases where the alleged perpetrator is present in Spain, where the victims
or perpetrator is of Spanish nationality, or where there is some other relevant tie to Spain. In addition, the case cannot be the subject of an effective
investigation or prosecution in another national court or in an international tribunal. It also, on the plus side, adds crimes against humanity
and human trafficking to the list of universal jurisdiction crimes.4 As a
result of these modifications and their chilling effect on both judges and
complainants, a number of investigations, including those involving Tibet,
and the United States have been shelved. For example, on 20 December
2012, the Spanish Supreme Court denied an appeal of the dismissal of a
case against Bush-era officials for creating the legal context for torture in
Guanta¤namo, on grounds that the United States government’s administrative and disciplinary proceedings were adequate.
However, not all Spanish universal jurisdiction cases have disappeared in
the wake of changes to the law. A case against high-ranking military and
police officers for genocide, terrorism and torture in Guatemala remains open,
and evidence in the case has been shared with the Guatemalan prosecutors’
office. While there are a few victims of Spanish nationality involved, most
victims (and all alleged perpetrators) are Guatemalan. The case involving the
killing of six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper and her daughter in El Salvador
also continues. While six of the eight victims were Spanish nationals, the
impact of the case is primarily felt in El Salvador, where it is one of several
emblematic crimes of the civil war period. So far, the Salvadoran Supreme
Court has denied extradition requests by Spain. In an ironic twist, one of the
defendants in the case, former Colonel Inocente Montano, has been detained
in the United States and pled guilty to visa fraud charges stemming from
his non-disclosure of his military service and role in the case when he moved
to the United States many years ago. The Spanish government has submitted
a request for extradition, once Montano finishes serving his time in a United
States prison. If the United States accedes, he may be the first Salvadoran
defendant tried in the case.
A final irony: the one place where an investigation continues into
Franco-era crimes (the investigation shut down by the Spanish courts in
the Garzo¤n case) is Argentina. Judge Maria Servini de Cubria opened an investigation on 14 April 2010 in a Buenos Aires federal court into these
crimes under Argentina’s own universal jurisdiction law. One of the victims,
93 year old Dario Rivas, for example, asked the court to investigate the
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5 He was convicted of illegal wiretapping in January 2012, in a case involving allegations of
corruption that reached high into the ruling Popular Party. See my ASIL Insight, supra note 3.
6 South African Litigation Centre and another v. National Director for Public Prosecutions and another,
North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria, 8 May 2012. See the contribution by Gerhard Werle and
Paul Bornkamm on the case in this issue of the Journal.
7 For a chronology and detailed discussion, see www.hrw.org/habre-case (visited 29 April 2013).
8 See www.publicserviceeurope.com/article/2852/swedens-unprecedented-and-unique-genocide
-trial (visited 29 April 2013).
9 See www.ccij.ca/programs/cases/index.php?DOC_INST¼19 (visited 19 April 2013).
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1936 murder of his father, a former Republican mayor of the small town of
Castro del Rey whose body has still not been found. As of December
2012, some 5000 people had joined the complaint, and the judge was
exploring how to take testimonies by video conference. While Garzo¤n has
now been effectively removed from the Spanish judiciary,5 his revenge may
be that the target of his first universal jurisdiction case ç crimes in
Argentina ç will return the favour by looking into the hundreds of thousands of missing in his homeland.
The setbacks to a truly universal jurisdiction are real: it seems that states
are willing to countenance a ‘no safe haven’ policy for alleged criminals
who reside on or visit their territory, but not to pursue them beyond borders. This is less than what many advocates hoped for in 1998, and creates
problems in amassing the necessary evidence in time to snare visiting ge¤ nocidaires or war criminals. But it is not the ‘death’ of universal jurisdiction,
by any means. Indeed, over the last year, a South African court told the
prosecutors’ office that it was required to open an investigation into the
crimes of Zimbabwean police and government officials accused of systematic torture, arising especially out of a March 2007 incident. Lawyers for
the victims argued that under South Africa’s ICC Act the state was obliged
to investigate when there was evidence that the alleged perpetrators regularly visited South Africa, and so prosecutors could anticipate their presence.6 Hisse'ne Habre¤, the former dictator of Chad, is finally on trial in
Senegal, where he resides, after a decade long saga that has encompassed
the Senegalese and Belgian courts, an African Union commitment to an
‘African’ trial, changes in Senegalese law, a decision by the International
Court of Justice directing Senegal to properly investigate and try the case,
and a novel funding scheme wherein the European Union finances part of
a trial in Senegal.7 Rwandans are on trial in Sweden (for genocide)8 and
Canada (for genocide and crimes against humanity).9 The United Kingdom
recently arrested Colonel Kumar Lama, accused of torturing two men
when he was a police official in Nepal in 2005, while he was in the country visiting family. So, like much of international justice, we may be witnessing a tamping down of expectations. Universal jurisdiction will be a
useful adjunct when alleged perpetrators are found residing or travelling
outside the country where the crimes took place, but it will not replace
(or, for the most part, catalyse) domestic investigations.
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In the end, there is unmistakably a hangover after the euphoria of 1998. The
question is, was the experiment of international justice a ‘bubble’, like our
housing and financial bubbles, now sadly burst? Or is the current period a
necessary corrective to sky-high expectations, combined with an inevitable
backlash from still powerful actors? I would suggest that the latter is a more
fruitful optic, and that the moment creates an opportunity for creative
broadening of justice mechanisms. In the short term, this will mean figuring
out how to use the idea of positive complementarity to innovate in how international actors, starting with the ICC, engage with national systems. This
engagement may at times look more like the United Nation’s involvement
in the Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala, which embedded international prosecutors with national ones to train and report on but not actually
prosecute, than the current ICC support for national prosecutions. At other
times, building on the experience with Habre¤, it may involve creating regional
institutions like the proposed Criminal Chamber of the African Court of
Justice and Human Rights, which will need both resources and independence
to become more than a transparent effort to undermine the ICC. And in
the longer term, these institutions, whatever their national^international
conformation, will have to develop greater capacity than they have shown
to date to confront the financiers, plunderers, arms merchants and money
launderers who fuel conflicts, and who rob peoples of the fruits of peace.

